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ABSTRACT
United States courts are demanding that businesses break foreign
laws at an exponentially increasing rate. A practice that was virtually
unheard of only 30 years ago is now so widespread that U.S. courts are
ordering foreign lawbreaking in the most trivial discovery matters. When
a court receives a discovery request that violates a foreign law, it applies
the 5-part Aérospatiale balancing test—a test where 4 of the 5 factors are
left to the subjective decisions of the judge. By ordering foreign law
breaking, our courts—often biased in favor of United States discovery
rules—are encouraging abusive litigation tactics, undermining the rule of
law, and causing friction with foreign nations. In this article, I update my
original work on court ordered law breaking by analyzing these orders
over the last three years, and I conclude that the Supreme Court needs to
resolve the circuit split regarding the proper way to handle requests for
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information that violate foreign laws.
The past dozen years has witnessed an extraordinary surge in United
States courts ordering parties to violate foreign laws. Courts not only
encourage businesses to violate the law—they demand that businesses
break the law of foreign countries. The very idea of court-ordered law
breaking is startling. 1 Until recently, it was virtually unheard of for courts
to demand that companies break the law. As recently as 1987, the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals, in a per curiam order, openly doubted “whether
a court may ever order action in violation of foreign laws.” 2 Yet not only
is it now happening, the number of cases is increasing exponentially. 3
Moreover, courts order litigants to produce documents in violation of the
law for seemingly trivial reasons. For example, one court ordered the
unlawful production of documents in a case where the court had already
expressed “skepticism that [the plaintiff] could ever make out a claim.” 4
Court-ordered law breaking typically occurs during litigation
discovery. 5 A litigant may demand that the opposing side produce
documents located overseas despite foreign laws prohibiting that
production. 6 A common scenario involves litigants seeking a bank’s
overseas financial records even though these cannot be produced without
violating the foreign nation’s laws regarding bank secrecy and financial
privacy. 7 When courts receive document requests that call for violating
foreign laws, they usually apply the five-factor Aérospatiale balancing
test to decide whether to order the violation of foreign law. 8 Four of the
five factors in this test require courts to make subjective judgments (e.g.,
whether the desired information is “important”). But are United States
courts able to impartially conduct such a balancing test? Or will United

* Geoffrey Sant is a partner at Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, and teaches at Fordham Law
School. He is also a Director of the Chinese Business Lawyers Association. Thanks to Spencer
Michaels, Grant McLeod, Lisa Whitacre, Guenna Bollinger and the Akron Law Review for their time
and attention in editing this article.
1. Geoffrey Sant, Court-Ordered Law Breaking: U.S. Courts Increasingly Order the
Violation of Foreign Law, 81 BROOKLYN L.R. 181, 181 (2015).
2. In re Sealed Case, No. 87-5208, 825 F.2d 494, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
3. See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
4. Republic Techs. (Na), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, No. 16-civ-3401 (SIS), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158986, *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).
5. See Sant, supra note 1 at 181-82.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 215-19.
8. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 544 n.28 (1987). As discussed infra, courts in some circuits apply different
versions of the Aérospatiale test. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
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States courts necessarily show bias in favor of United States discovery—
and the violation of foreign laws?
In this article, I update my original article on this subject (CourtOrdered Law Breaking) from three years ago. Focusing in particular upon
decisions from the past three years, I empirically analyze the results of
every single court case to apply the five-factor Aérospatiale balancing
test. The results are clear: United States courts are overwhelmingly
predisposed to order the production of documents in violation of foreign
laws. In doing so, United States courts encourage abusive litigation
tactics, undermine the rule of law, demand the punishment of innocent
businesses and individuals, and cause friction with international allies. As
this article demonstrates, the number of these cases has increased rapidly,
indicating that litigants may be strategically requesting the violation of
foreign laws for litigation advantage. Moreover, a severe circuit split has
developed as to which Aérospatiale balancing test should be applied,
resulting in courts applying different sets of factors and obtaining
contradictory results. 9
The Supreme Court has expressed deep concern about the problem
of court-ordered law breaking. In the 2018 case of U.S. v. Microsoft, at
least one-third of the justices expressed concern during oral argument
about the “international problems” caused by court-ordered law
breaking. 10 Regrettably, the controversy in U.S. v. Microsoft was mooted
by superseding law and the Supreme Court lost the opportunity to
confront the problem of courts demanding that businesses commit
unlawful acts abroad. Nevertheless, as the Supreme Court itself appears
to have recognized, the need is great for the Court to step in and correct
the current morass of court-ordered law breaking.
I. THE AÉROSPATIALE BALANCING TEST
Civil litigation in the United States features broad discovery. 11
Litigants generally must produce any information that could lead to
admissible evidence. 12 Litigants in the United States sometimes seek
information held abroad that is prohibited from production by foreign law
(such as financial privacy and bank secrecy laws). 13 The conflict between
9. See infra, Section II.
10. Transcript of Proceedings at 12, 38, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S.Ct. 1186 (2018).
11. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978); Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947).
12. See Fed. R, Civ. P. 26(b)(1); see also Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., 437 U.S. at 351; Hickman,
329 U.S. at 501.
13. See Sant, supra note 1, passim.
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United States discovery requests and foreign laws is both frequent and
severe; many foreign nations have strict laws protecting individual
privacy or financial secrecy. For example, countries as varied as Belgium,
Brazil, and Japan have each enshrined the right to privacy in their national
constitutions. 14 Likewise, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union states that all people have “the right to the protection of
personal data concerning him or her.” 15 Broad demands for discovery in
litigation frequently conflict with these and other foreign laws.
In 1987, the Supreme Court dealt with the problem of conflicts
between United States discovery demands and the laws of foreign
nations. 16 In Aérospatiale, the Supreme Court explicitly refused to
“articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication,” 17
effectively forcing lower courts to fashion their own framework for
determining when to require the production of documents in violation of
foreign law. Despite this lack of guidance, lower courts attempted to
fashion from the Supreme Court’s decision an “Aérospatiale test” to apply
to requests for information in violation of foreign law. Different courts
have established different Aérospatiale tests, each of which involves the
weighing of a somewhat different set of factors. The most popular of these
tests is the five-factor test (discussed further below), in which United
States courts weigh the interest in the discovery against the interest of the
foreign nation in its laws. The five-factor test is taken from a footnote in
the Aérospatiale decision in which the Supreme Court majority cited to
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 18 The five
factors to be weighed are: (1) the importance of the discovery; (2) the
specificity of the request; (3) the origin of the information; (4) the
availability of alternative means; and (5) a comparison of United States
and foreign interests at stake. 19 Four of these five factors require
subjective judgments (such as the “importance” of the information
sought).
Commentary on the Aérospatiale decision and the various tests has
long been extremely negative, with many complaining that the factors
applied are amorphous, and that the tests are unworkable and prone to

14. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA, RESOLUTION 103, at 4 (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://perma.cc/UC9A-GQQ6.
15. Charter Of Fundamental Rights Of The European Union, art. 8(1), 2012 O.J. (C 326/02).
16. Societe Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 544.
19. Sant, supra note 1 at 187.
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bias. 20 After all, United States courts overwhelmingly rule in favor of
ordering discovery (and thus demanding the violation of foreign law). 21
Courts reach this result apparently due to their belief that the importance
of discovery in United States litigation outweighs all other national
interests. In 2015, I conducted the first-ever empirical analysis of all
attempts by United States courts to apply the five-factor test in the context
of requests for court orders requiring production of documents in violation
of foreign law. 22 As I concluded at that time:
A review of all cases applying the five-factor Aérospatiale test reveals
evidence of pro-forum bias. U.S. courts have found that each of the four
subjective factors weigh in favor of violating foreign law by lopsided
ratios as high as thirteen to one. These extreme results suggest that the
warnings of pro-forum bias expressed by the Aérospatiale dissent and
by commentators have proven correct. 23

In this article, I review the past three years of cases applying the
Aérospatiale five-factor test to determine whether the pro-forum bias
identified in the previous article has continued. As I explain below, it has
not only continued, it appears to have accelerated, and the harms caused
by court-ordered law breaking have grown worse.
As discussed below, the need for Supreme Court guidance has
become acute. First, United States courts have clearly overstepped their
bounds in regularly demanding that businesses break the law in foreign
countries. Second, there is a severe circuit split as to the appropriate test
to apply in cases where discovery requests conflict with foreign laws.
Third, there is a circuit split as to the specific issue of when and whether
banks must provide financial records in violation of bank secrecy and
financial privacy laws.
20. See id. at 187-91 (citing, inter alia, Abigail West, Comment: A Meaningful Opportunity to
Comply, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 189, 212 (2014); Patrick J. Borchers, The Incredible Shrinking Hague
Evidence Convention, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 73, 81 (2003); James Chalmers, The Hague Evidence
Convention and Discovery Inter Partes: Trial Court Decisions Post-Aérospatiale, 8 TUL. J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 189, 203 (2000); Russell J. Weintraub, The Need for Awareness of International Standards
When Construing Multilateral Conventions: The Arbitration, Evidence, and Service Conventions, 28
TEX. INT’L L.J. 441, 460-61, 470 (1993); Mark A. Cotter, The Hague Convention: Selfish U.S.
Interpretation Aggravates Foreign Signatories and Mandates Changes to Federal Discovery Rules,
6 FLA. J. INT’L L. 233, 243 (1991); Steven R. Swanson, Comity, International Dispute Resolution
Agreements, and the Supreme Court, 21 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 333, 333 (1990); Gary B. Born &
Scott Hoing, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Aérospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence
Convention, 24 INT’L LAW. 393, 404 (1990); George A. Bermann, The Hague Evidence Convention
in the Supreme Court: A Critique of the Aérospatiale Decision, 63 TULANE L. REV. 525, 542 (1989)).
21. See id.
22. See Sant, supra note 1.
23. Id. at 237.
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II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CIRCUIT SPLITS
There is a great need for Supreme Court guidance on the issue of the
conflict of laws. First, as the current Supreme Court appears to have
recognized, lower courts have overstepped their bounds, regularly issuing
orders requiring the violation of foreign laws in a “raw exercise of their
jurisdictional power.” 24 In fact, in a number of United States court
decisions, the courts have demanded that foreign countries punish or
imprison those who obey United States court orders. 25 These decisions—
and other decisions requiring businesses to break the law at home or
overseas—damage the rule of law and harm international relations. 26
Worse, these decisions encourage abusive discovery by litigants eager to
use the courts as a means of trapping an opponent between the conflicting
requirements of United States court orders and foreign laws.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has expressed an interest in
correcting the current problem of court-ordered law breaking.
Specifically, during oral argument in U.S. v. Microsoft, at least one-third
of the justices raised concerns about the phenomenon of court-ordered law
breaking:
•

•

•

Justice Sotomayor: “[T]he problem that Justice Ginsburg
alludes to is the fact that, by [demanding production of
overseas documents], we are trenching on the very thing
that . . . our jurisprudence doesn’t want to do, which is to create
international problems.” 27
Justice Sotomayor: “[A]ll those amici . . . have written
complaining about how this would conflict with so much
foreign law. We’ve got a bunch of amici briefs telling us how
much this conflicts.” 28
Justice Breyer: [W]hat happens if you go to Microsoft and you
ask . . . for some bank records that are in Italy, and in fact, Italy
does have a law, we imagine, which says absolutely no bank

24. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 548 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
25. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
26. See id.
27. Transcript of Proceedings at 12, U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138, S.Ct. 1186 (2018).
28. Id. at *13. The “amici briefs” referred to by Justice Sotomayor appear be those submitted
by (1) the E-Discovery Institute, Deere & Company, Freddie Mac, Bayer U.S. LLC, Gilead Sciences,
Inc., GlaxoSmithKline LLC, Pfizer Inc., and individual amici; and by (2) the European Company
Lawyers Association. Both of these briefs cite to my arguments in Court-Ordered Law Breaking. See
Brief for E-Discovery Institute et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 17-31, U.S. v.
Microsoft Corp., 138, S.Ct. 1186 (2018)(closely following and summarizing my arguments); Brief
for European Company Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 29, U.S.
v. Microsoft Corp., 138, S.Ct. 1186 (2018) (citing to my arguments).
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record can be taken. . .?” 29
Justice Breyer: “So the answer is that, which many amici
suggest to us, that what should be done in such a case is you go
to the magistrate or the judge and you say, judge, I want you to
look at the factors of comity. And one of them will be . . . this
Italian law, . . . which says you can’t [take the documents].” 30
Justice Kagan: “But you are agreeing . . . that a court in that
circumstance should conduct a comity analysis?” 31
Justice Breyer: “Now the government suggested what’s
impractical about this, in any situation where, say, Microsoft
thinks that there really is a problem here because of a foreign
law, which might forbid it for a variety of reasons, what you do
is you—Microsoft goes to the magistrate and says, look, there’s
a problem here because of the law of other countries. . .” 32
Justice Breyer: “You’d take foreign interests into account.
Maybe you’d use Aerospatiale standards. One brief tells us
they’re not good enough, but it didn’t say what we should
use. . .” 33

The in-depth questioning by these justices indicates that the Supreme
Court already recognizes the need to correct the problems created by the
Aérospatiale test. Unfortunately, the Microsoft case became moot due to
superseding law and the Supreme Court therefore lost the chance to weigh
in on the “international problems,” pro-forum bias by trial courts, and the
ongoing circuit split. 34 Nevertheless, the extensive questioning indicates
that the Supreme Court may be interested in correcting the problems
created by the Aérospatiale test through a future case. This article
provides further empirical evidence for the Supreme Court to consider
29. Transcript of Proceedings at 27. Justice Breyer appears to be referencing the arguments in
Court-Ordered Law Breaking, which focused heavily on banking cases. See Sant, supra note 1 at
214-19. U.S. v. Microsoft did not involve bank records.
30. Id. at 27-28.
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 38-39.
33. Id. at 39-40.
34. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 138, S.Ct. 1186 (2018); see also, e.g., Kieren McCarthy, Supreme
Court punts on Microsoft email seizure decision after Cloud Act passes US Congress, REGISTER (Apr.
17, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1034498/justices-drop-microsoft-warrant-row-butfight-far-from-over [https://perma.cc/3D65-5N2W] (“The United States Supreme Court has dodged
a critical legal question. . . .; a situation made all the more confusing by the fact that federal appeals
courts across the US have come to different conclusions about the best way of dealing with the
issue.”); Allison Grande, Justices Drop Microsoft Warrant Row, But Fight Far From Over, LAW360
(Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/04/17/supreme_court_pu
nts_email_seizure_decision_into_the_long_grass/ [https://perma.cc/S52S-TB69] (“The . . . demise
of the Supreme Court dispute also leave[s] unaddressed broader overseas data transfer questions that
are likely to soon re-emerge in new legal disputes. . .”).
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when analyzing the effectiveness of the Aérospatiale test and in designing
a better way for lower courts to deal with international conflicts of law.
While this article focuses primarily upon court bias and the problems
created by courts ordering businesses to violate foreign laws, the Supreme
Court should also review and reconsider the Aérospatiale test in order to
resolve a pronounced circuit split. As discussed below, such a severe
circuit split calls out for Supreme Court guidance and correction.
The Supreme Court’s Aérospatiale decision specifically avoided
providing guidance to lower courts when considering a request for
discovery in violation of foreign law. 35 As a result, both circuit courts and
district courts created a variety of “Aérospatiale tests,” seizing upon
various snippets of language in the Aérospatiale decision. These tests each
contradict and conflict with each other, and they focus upon very different
factors.
The Fifth Circuit (and a number of district courts) created a threefactor Aérospatiale test for handling instances where discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would conflict with foreign law. 36 In the
words of the Fifth Circuit, “[t]he district court is directed to determine
whether [alternative discovery procedures] are appropriate after ‘scrutiny
in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that
resort to these procedures would prove effective.’” 37 The Fifth Circuit
took this three-factor test from language within the Supreme Court’s
Aérospatiale ruling. 38 The Fifth Circuit’s three-factor test “emphasizes the
sovereignty interests of foreign states.” 39 A number of district courts
outside the Fifth Circuit have also applied this three-factor test. 40
Other courts, led by the Second Circuit, have applied a four-factor
Aérospatiale test. 41 This four-factor test examines “(1) the competing
interests of the nations whose laws are in conflict, (2) the hardship that
compliance would impose on the party or witness from whom discovery
is sought, (3) the importance to the litigation of the information and
documents requested, and (4) the good faith of the party resisting
35. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546 (declining to “articulate specific rules to guide this delicate
task of adjudication.”).
36. In re Anscheutz & Co., GmbH, 838 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir. 1988).
37. Id. (quoting Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544).
38. Id.
39. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2592 (EEF), 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 95453, at *21-22 (E.D. La. May 16, 2016).
40. See, e.g., Valois of Am., Inc. v. Risdon Corp., 183 F.R.D. 344, 346 (D. Conn. 1997); In re
Aircrash Disaster Near Roselawn, Ind., Oct. 31, 1994, 172 F.R.D. 295, 309 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
41. See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16, 22 (2d Cir. 1998); Bodner
v. Paribas, 202 F.R.D. 370, 374-75 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc.,
116 F.R.D. 517, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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discovery.” 42 This test also focuses primarily upon the interests of the
entities resisting discovery. Three of the four factors focus upon the
sovereign interests of the foreign nation(s), or upon the impact upon and
good faith of the party resisting discovery. Only the factor of
“importance” focuses upon the impact upon the needs of the party seeking
the discovery.
The Ninth Circuit has applied yet another Aérospatiale test, this time
a seven-factor balancing test. According to the Ninth Circuit, the seven
factors to consider are: (1) importance of the discovery to the litigation;
(2) the specificity of the request; (3) whether the information originated
in the United States; (4) the availability of alternative means of obtaining
the information; (5) the extent to which noncompliance would undermine
important United States interests or interests of the state where the
information is located; (6) “the extent and the nature of the hardship that
inconsistent enforcement would impose upon the person”; (7) “the extent
to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.” 43 These
factors place much more of the focus upon the desired discovery (and less
upon the impact of law breaking upon the foreign country or the business
forced to produce information) than do the other Aérospatiale tests.
The “greater number of courts,” however, have followed a fivefactor Aérospatiale test, consisting of (1) importance of the discovery; (2)
specificity of the request; (3) origin of the information; (4) availability of
alternative means; (5) comparison of United States and foreign interests
at stake. 44 These factors comprise the first five factors of the Ninth
Circuit’s test—but leave out the Ninth Circuit’s final two factors.
As can be seen, the circuits have split dramatically on the proper way
of applying the Aérospatiale comity test. Moreover, these different tests
focus on different concerns and lead to different results. For example, the
Ninth Circuit test appears to focus on the litigant’s desire for discovery,
while the Fifth Circuit test focuses on the sovereign interests of the foreign
states. At this point, the only way to resolve the circuit split is for the
Supreme Court to establish the correct mechanism for resolving requests
for discovery in violation of foreign law.
There is yet another circuit split relating to court-ordered law
breaking. In the specific case of banks, there has been a deep and enduring
split as to “whether and to what extent” banks must produce financial

42.
43.
44.
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records in violation of foreign law. 45 In 1958, the Supreme Court reversed
the dismissal of a lawsuit where the plaintiff could not lawfully produce
records from a foreign bank despite a discovery request for those
documents. 46 As the Supreme Court stated, “It is hardly debatable that
fear of criminal prosecution constitutes a weighty excuse for
nonproduction, and this excuse is not weakened because the laws
preventing compliance are those of a foreign sovereign.” 47 Likewise, the
Second Circuit, 48 D.C. Circuit, 49 and Seventh Circuit 50 each rejected bald
requests for the order of banking records in violation of foreign financial
privacy laws. By way of contrast, the Fifth Circuit 51 and the Eleventh
Circuit 52 both required the production of financial records in violation of
bank secrecy laws. The Restatement of Foreign Law has noted that
whether or not banks must produce financial records in violation of
foreign law so as “to avoid sanction in the United States is not clear.” 53
The Supreme Court urgently needs to address court-ordered law
breaking in order to respond to (1) the enormous surge in United States
trial courts demanding that companies break the law abroad; (2) the circuit
split as to how to deal with discovery requests that seek to require
companies to break the law; and (3) the circuit split as to banks’
obligations to produce documents in violation of foreign financial privacy
and bank secrecy laws.
III. IS THERE PRO-FORUM BIAS IN THE APPLICATION OF THE
AÉROSPATIALE TEST?
For this article, I conducted an empirical analysis of every United
States trial court decision to apply the Aérospatiale five-factor test. By
extremely lopsided margins, United States courts have found that each of
the four subjective factors (which consist of such factors as the

45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §442(c)
(1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §442, cmt. h
(1987).
46. Société Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles Et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,
357 U.S. 197 (1958).
47. Id. at 211.
48. Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
49. In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494, 498-99 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
50. United States v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 346-47 (7th Cir. 1983).
51. United States v. Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976).
52. United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia I, 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1119 (1983).
53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, Supra note
45.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss1/4

10

Sant: Businesses Break the Law

2018]

BUSINESSES BREAK THE LAW

131

“importance” of the requested discovery) weigh in favor of ordering
companies to break the law overseas.
Courts found each subjective factor to weigh in favor of violating
foreign law by ratios of at least four to one.54 In two cases, the ratio was
at least thirteen to one in favor of ordering companies to break the law
abroad. 55 Such extremely lopsided ratios strongly indicate that United
States courts are unable to objectively weigh United States and foreign
interests. A deeper review of specific cases shows that United States
courts indeed have a pronounced pro-forum bias, and these courts
regularly demand that companies break the law overseas in questionable
situations.
The willingness of courts to demand that companies break the law
overseas has encouraged litigants to seek this illegal discovery. Litigants
abusively wield discovery requests as a means of forcing entities to
choose between punishment in the United States (for failure to comply
with a court order) and punishment in the foreign country (for violating
the law). 56
The willingness of courts to order law breaking abroad has clearly
encouraged litigants to seek these orders. The number of requests for
courts to order law breaking abroad has skyrocketed over the past dozen
years. Over 91% of all requests for court-ordered law breaking occurred
between 2005 and the end of 2017. 57 By contrast, during the first eighteen
years after the Aérospatiale ruling, there were only six such cases. 58 Such
enormous, exponential growth strongly indicates that litigants are using
discovery conflicts as a litigation strategy. Trial courts that demand that
companies break the law have encouraged abusive litigation tactics. 59
Once discovery abuse and pro-forum bias become entrenched, they
are extraordinarily difficult to correct due to the “the limited appellate
review of interlocutory discovery decisions.” 60 Moreover, the system of
precedents means that other United States trial courts repeat and cite to

54. See infra Sections IV(A)-(E).
55. See infra Sections IV(A), (B).
56. See infra notes 112-117 and accompanying text (bank that was nonparty to litigation
sanctioned and ordered to pay daily fine; the bank later settled for $250,000 USD.); see also, e.g.,
Alex Lakatos, Bank Response to Discovery Requests for Privileged Materials, 33 REV. BANKING &
FIN. SERVS. 45, 46 (2017).
57. I base these statistics upon cases applying the Aérospatiale five-factor test in the context
of court-ordered law breaking. As already discussed, not all courts apply the Aérospatiale five-factor
test. See infra Section V.
58. Id.
59. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
60. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 554 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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decisions infected with pro-forum bias. 61 This means that pro-forum bias
is self-perpetuating, and the Supreme Court should correct this bias at the
earliest opportunity. Worse, and as discussed further below, a number of
United States courts have even demanded that foreign governments
imprison those who comply with United States court orders. 62
IV. CASES APPLYING THE AÉROSPATIALE FIVE-FACTOR TEST
The Aérospatiale five-factor test requires United States courts to
weigh the value of their own work in managing litigation discovery
against the value of unfamiliar foreign laws. It is perhaps unsurprising that
United States courts have a cognitive bias in favor of United States
discovery. 63 The remainder of this article analyzes the results of the fivefactor test, focusing primarily on cases from the past three years. The
results show that court decisions have been infected with overwhelming
pro-forum bias.
For this paper, I analyzed every United States court decision
applying the Aérospatiale five-factor test to determine whether or not to
order discovery productions in violation of foreign law. For each of these
cases, I analyzed and calculated the court’s conclusions as to each of the
five factors. 64 (This means that I did not consider those cases applying the
three-factor or four-factor Aérospatiale test. I only considered the first
five factors for cases that applied the Ninth Circuit’s seven-factor test.)
When courts treated a given factor as neutral, this factor was excluded
when calculating percentages; this is why the number of cases considered
is different for some of the factors. 65
In the end, I found seventy cases that applied Aérospatiale to requests
for court-ordered law breaking. 66 From these results, I conclude that (1)
courts display a pro-forum bias; and (2) there has been an exponential
increase in litigants seeking court-ordered violations of foreign law. 67 I

61. See, e.g., Chalmers, supra footnote 20 at 201.
62. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
63. See Sant, supra note 1 at 194.
64. For a more detailed discussion of the methodology, see Sant, supra note 1 at 194-197. The
statistical results of my 2015 article were independently confirmed in M.J. Hoda, The Aérospatiale
Dilemma: Why U.S. Courts Ignore Blocking Statutes and What Foreign States Can Do About It, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 231, 241 n.80 (2018).
65. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Stanford Intern. Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp 2d 323, 337 (N.D. Texas 2011)
(treating the fifth factor as neutral).
66. The cases I identified as applying Aérospatiale to the context of weighing whether to order
violations of foreign law are located in an appendix at the end of this article.
67. I previously noted that U.S. courts also appear to have an additional bias against nonWestern nations. See Sant, supra note 1 at 230-32. I have not been able to further refine my analysis
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discuss these results below.
A.

Factor One, “Importance”

Courts applying factor one (“importance”) weigh “the importance to
the . . . litigation of the documents or other information requested.” 68 By
the lopsided ratio of thirteen-to-one, United States courts overwhelmingly
find that this factor (“importance”) favors ordering companies to break
the law in foreign countries. In particular, 93% of courts (64 out of 69)
applying the Aérospatiale five-factor test concluded that “importance”
justified violating foreign law. Such lopsided results in a purported
balancing test is evidence that courts have a pro-forum bias.
Many courts unwittingly convert the first factor of the Aérospatiale
from a test of “importance” into a test of “relevance.” 69 That is, instead of
weighing whether documents are important to a litigation, courts ask only
whether the documents are relevant. If they are relevant, the court claims
that this is enough to weigh in favor of demanding that businesses break
the law. But “relevance” is not the language used in Aérospatiale, and it
is an extremely low standard for something as serious as ordering
businesses to break the law. Yet courts frequently assert that factor one
weighs in favor of court-ordered law breaking simply because “the
documents are relevant to the litigation.” 70 Similarly, another recent court
decision ruled that this factor weighed in favor of court-ordered law
breaking because “the information sought . . . is generally relevant and
otherwise discoverable under the FRCP.” 71
Even when courts have not converted factor one from a test of
“importance” into one of “relevance,” courts seem to find that almost
on this point because there have not been a sufficient number of cases in the past three years to modify
my original conclusions. In particular, because almost every case during the past three years has ruled
in favor of violating foreign law, it is not possible to identify any particular difference in how courts
have treated Western and non-Western nations during this time frame.
68. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
69. Sant, supra note 1 at 197-99; see also, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust
Litigation, 2014 WL 6602711, No. 07-Civ-05944, 2014 WL 5462496, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2014)
(“The Court finds the [document sought] is relevant. . . . This weighs for production.”); Trueposition
Inc. v. LM Ericsson Telephone Co., No. 11-Civ-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012)
(“The documents in question deal with jurisdictional discovery . . . and are relevant discovery.”); In
re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust, 278 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Payment Card
Interchange Fee and Merch. Disc. Antitrust Litig., No. 05-MD-1720, 2010 WL 3420517, at *9
(E.D.N.Y Aug. 27, 2010) (similar).
70. See, e.g., Philips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 14-civ-0289, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76054, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. June 10, 2016).
71. Connex R. R. LLC v. AXACorporate Solutions Assur., 16-civ-2368 (RAO), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 215050, *35-6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017).
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anything qualifies as “important.” In one recent case, the court rejected
the defendant’s argument that the information sought was not actually
critical to “the outcome of this case,” declaring: “Plaintiffs should have
access to this information in order to adequately build a case.” 72 The court
seemed unconcerned that the information was not critical or key, and
instead was satisfied that the information would be helpful in organizing
or planning a litigation (“to adequately build a case”). Based on this, the
court declared the information was “highly relevant” and that this
“relevance” (not “importance”) caused this factor to weigh in favor of
violating foreign laws. 73 Documents peripheral to a litigation should not
be deemed a sufficient reason to order businesses to break the law.
In a litigation dispute over trademarks, a court found that the
importance of the documents weighed in favor of violating foreign law
even though the court had already indicated it believed the plaintiff had
no valid case. 74 Although “the district court judge has expressed
‘skepticism that [the plaintiff] could ever make out a claim of confusion’
as required to establish trade dress confusion,” nevertheless the
documents were still declared to be important enough to require the
defendant company to break the law abroad. 75 The court explained its
conclusion with nothing more than a statement that “the district court has
not [yet] dismissed the trade dress claim.” 76 It would seem wrong for a
court to order a party to break the law and risk penalties or imprisonment
in order to produce documents regarding a claim that has no basis.
In yet other cases, courts have declared it “important” for companies
to produce documents in violation of foreign laws even though the
documents were requested as part of a fishing expedition to identify
additional potential defendants. 77 For example, banks have been ordered
to produce swaths of financial records in violation of bank secrecy laws
simply so that plaintiffs could identify other deep-pocketed defendants. 78
72. Burrow v. Forjas Taurus S.A., 16-civ-21606 (EGT), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, *14-15
(S.D. Fla. June 16, 2017); see also, e.g., In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, No. C07-59944-SC, 2014 WL 6602711, No. C-07-5944-SC, 2014 WL 5462496 , at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 23,
2014) (finding “importance” where the documents may be of “significant value in helping Plaintiffs
organize their case and may identify previously undiscovered competitor contacts”).
73. Id. at *15.
74. Republic Techs. (Na), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, No. 16-civ-3401, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158986, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017).
75. Id.
76. Id. at *11.
77. Sant, supra note 1 at 199.
78. Id. (citing Tiffany LLC v. Qi Andrew, 276 F.R.D. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Old Ladder Litig.
Co., LLC v. Investcorp Bank, B.S.C., No. 08-Civ-0876(RMD)(THK), 2008 WL 2224292, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008); Export-Import Bank of the US v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co., LTD., No. 03-
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To summarize, courts have overwhelmingly found that the factor of
“importance” weighs in favor of ordering the violation of foreign laws.
Courts have found by a ratio of over thirteen-to-one that this factor weighs
in favor of court-ordered law breaking. In some cases, courts have
unwittingly replaced the standard of “importance” with a standard of mere
“relevance.” In other cases, courts have found “importance” in extremely
questionable circumstances, such as when the court has already indicated
that the plaintiffs appear to have no case, or when the information is
merely to help a party “organize” its case. In other instances, courts have
found “importance” to exist even when the plaintiffs are not seeking
actual evidence or proof, but are instead seeking to identify additional
potential targets for suit. All of this indicates that courts have allowed proforum bias to undercut the Aérospatiale balancing test.
B.

Factor Two, “Specificity”

Courts applying the second factor of the Aérospatiale test must
weigh “the degree of specificity of the request.” Courts find this factor to
favor discovery (and the violation of foreign law) in 94% of cases (65 out
of 69), a ratio of more than fifteen-to-one. It seems unlikely that the
Supreme Court would create a balancing test where the results are so
overwhelmingly skewed in one direction.
Many courts have misinterpreted the command to weigh the
“specificity” of the request. The term “specificity” is ambiguous in that it
could refer to (1) the degree to which the document requests are narrowly
tailored; or (2) how clearly the document requests identify the documents
sought. While both interpretations are linguistically possible, the only
sensible interpretation is that the Supreme Court intended the factor of
“specificity” to refer to the degree to which a document request is
“narrowly tailored” (that is, limited in scope). 79 After all, “[i]t would be

Civ-08554, 2009 WL 1055673, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
79. See, e.g., Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 73 F. Supp. 3d 397, 401 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22,
2014); Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 293 F.R.D. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); CE Intern. Res.
Holdings, LLC. v. S.A. Minerals, Ltd. Partnership, No. 12-civ-08087 (CM)(SN), 2013 WL 2661037,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013); Lantheus Medical Imagining, Inc. v. Zurich American Ins., 841 F.
Supp. 2d 769, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); S.E.C. v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 776 F. Supp. 2d 323, 332
(N.D. Tex. 2011); JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. PT Indah Kiat Pulp and Paper Corp., Tbk, No. 02civ-6240, 2011 WL 5588764 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2011); AstraZeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., No. 08civ-1512(RMB/AMD), 2011 WL 1421800, at *13 (D.N.J. March 31, 2011); Milliken & Co. v. Bank
of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Gucci America Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, 2010
WL 808639, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2010); Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, 249 F.R.D. 429, 441
(E.D.N.Y. 2008); Weiss v. National Westminster Bank, PLC., 242 F.R.D. 33, 44 (E.D.N.Y. 2007);
Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, No. 94-civ-1954, 2002 WL 472252 (E.D. La. March 28,
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remarkable if the Supreme Court really intended that foreign law should
be violated in part because document requests are clearly written.” 80 Many
courts, however, have misinterpreted the factor of “specificity” as asking
whether the desired documents are clearly identified.81
In one recent case, for example, the defendant “emphasize[d] that
Plaintiffs have served over 100 RFPs [requests for production] in this
action.” 82 Nevertheless, the court asserted that this massive number of
document requests, which each “may include within their scope a large
number of documents,” was nonetheless specific. 83 According to the
court, “The fact that Plaintiffs have served a large number of RFPs overall
in this case does not necessarily mean that they are not entitled to this
discovery.” 84 It is hard to square the court’s analysis with the Aérospatiale
test’s requirement that the “specificity” of the requests is a factor to be
weighed either in favor or against ordering discovery. A “large number”
of document requests each seeking “a large number of documents” does
not appear to be a narrowly tailored request. This court seems to have
entirely brushed aside its obligation to weigh the narrowness of the
requests.
In another case, the court concluded that the standard of “specificity”
was met because the defendant was able to recognize that the requests
would violate Quebec law. 85 Under this extraordinary reasoning, the court
declared that the fact that the defendant could understand the document
requests clearly enough to recognize that they sought documents that were
prohibited from production by Quebec law was itself proof that the
document requests were “specific.” This bizarre logic essentially holds
that any party objecting to a document request as requiring the violation
of foreign law has already—by making that objection—proved that the
requests are sufficiently specific. Such an analysis makes a mockery of
the balancing test.
Exemplifying the willingness of courts to rubber-stamp broad
demands for the unlawful production of documents is a 2017 case in
Florida. A plaintiff named Mrs. Burrow claimed that while removing
2002) (weighing the factor of specificity by analyzing the degree to which the document requests
were “tailored” or “narrowly tailored”).
80. Sant, supra note 1 at 200.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 200-01 (providing examples).
83. Connex R. R. LLC v. AXACorporate Solutions Assur., No. 16-civ-2368-ODW (RAOx),
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215050, at *36-37 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017).
84. Id.
85. Skky, Inc. v. Thumbplay Ringtones, LLC, No. 13-civ-2072 (PJS/JJG), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 186391, at *17 (D. Minn. April 4, 2014).
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items from her vehicle, she dropped a revolver, and that “[t]he revolver
fired upon hitting the ground and a bullet struck Mrs. Burrow in the
knee.” 86 Putting aside the reliability of this allegation (which may be a
self-serving description as opposed to what really occurred), it certainly
seems an enormous jump from this single incident to a demand for “any
and all documents that refer to or relate to” a gun manufacturer’s design
and manufacturing of this brand of revolver. 87 Nevertheless, the court
found that the broad wording of these document requests (seeking “any
and all documents that refer to or relate to” a variety of subjects) were
sufficiently specific. 88 The court stated that it is “standard” in products
liability cases “for requests to include the phrases ‘any and all documents
relating to’ when the subject matter is on design, manufacturing, safety
manuals, etc.” 89 The court here seems to have misunderstood its task. The
question is not whether these document requests may be “standard” in a
run-of-the-mill products liability case, but rather whether in the context of
ordering a business to break the law such broad requests for “any and all”
documents are “specific” and “narrowly tailored.” The answer should
have been no.
One sign of the pro-forum bias of United States courts is that the
courts will sometimes describe the same set of document requests as
“specific” when analyzing factor two (“specificity”) but later state (in a
different context) that the documents demanded are insufficiently
specific. For example, one court found that factor two (“specificity”)
“likely favors compelling the disclosure” because “the plaintiff’s requests
are adequately specific.” 90 Yet this same court later declared (while
discussing factor three, the “origin of the information”) that “no
documents have been produced, identified, or described . . . with any
specificity.” 91 (Under factor three, which deals with the national origin of
the information being sought, courts weigh the factor in favor of ordering
discovery if the documents originated in the United States, but weigh the
factor against ordering discovery if the documents originated outside the
United States.) In this instance, the court ruled that “specificity” weighs
in favor of violating foreign laws when it analyzed factor two, but also
ruled (while considering factor three) that it was unable to state with
86. Burrow v. Forjas Taurus S.A., No. 15-civ-0641-D, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9259, at *2
(N.D. Tex. January 24, 2017) (citation omitted).
87. Id. at *16.
88. Id. at *17.
89. Id. at *16.
90. Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Heinkel AG & Co., KGAA, 290 F. Supp. 3d 681, 690
(E.D. Mich. 2017).
91. Id.
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certainty the national origin of the information due to the lack of “any
specificity” as to the documents. Thus, the same court claimed that the
same set of document requests are both specific and not specific, which is
a contradiction. When considering factor two, the court stated that the
document requests were specific but concluded that the third factor
(“origin of information”) “is either neutral or weighs slightly in favor of
compelling disclosure.” The court contradicted itself—but both times
concluded that the factor weighed in favor of ordering the violation of
foreign laws. This appears to show bias.
A different court contradicted itself in the same way. 92 The court
declared that factor two (“specificity”) weighed in favor of violating
foreign law, but when discussing factor four (“the availability of
alternative means of securing the information”), the court stated that the
documents could not be obtained easily through other means because “the
documents are numerous,” and “[t]his is not a case where only a few,
insubstantial documents are sought.” 93 (Factor four, which deals with
alternative means of obtaining the documents at issue, asks whether there
are alternative mechanisms by which the documents at issue could be
obtained without violating foreign laws, and if those mechanisms exist,
then the factor weighs against violating foreign laws.) Thus, in this case,
the same court determined both that the document requests were narrowly
tailored when discussing factor one (“specificity”), but also found that the
document requests were extremely broad when discussing factor four
(“alternative means”). 94 Here, too, the court contradicted itself—but both
times concluded that the factor weighed in favor of ordering the violation
of foreign laws. The fact that courts declare that the very same document
requests are both specific and not specific (and that in every case, they
find that the specificity or non-specificity weighs in favor of violating
foreign law) indicates that pro-forum bias has influenced the courts.
In many cases, courts will pare back overly broad document requests
in order to make them palatable to the court. This may seem reasonable,
but in fact the practice of paring back requests incentivizes litigants to
make overly broad requests in the first place. This is because “litigants are
incentivized to make a broad request that will either be accepted or else
trimmed to whatever level the court will accept.” 95 This abusive litigation
strategy of making overly broad requests for court-ordered law breaking
is already occurring; in one recent case, for example, the plaintiff freely
92.
93.
94.
95.

Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50, 53 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
Id. at 54.
Id.
Sant, supra note 1 at 202.
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“acknowledge[d] that these requests merely reflect an opening negotiating
position.” 96 Needless to say, litigants should not seek unnecessary
violations of foreign law as “an opening negotiating position.” Courts’
willingness to pare back abusive requests have had the perverse effect of
encouraging more discovery abuse.
Moreover, by unilaterally paring back overly broad requests, courts
tilt the results of factor two (“specificity”) so that they always weigh in
favor of United States discovery (and in favor of violating foreign laws).
For example, in one recent case, the plaintiffs sought forty categories of
documents, “the majority of which were completely unlimited in time and
scope and/or sought information irrelevant to the [litigation].” 97 The court
noted that, “as the request now stands, factor two weighs in favor of nonproduction” and that the discovery requested was “overly broad.”98
However, the court stated that it would unilaterally “narrow plaintiff’s
document request substantially” and that “[w]ith these new limitations,
factor two now weighs in favor of production.” 99 As can be seen, the court
has effectively rewarded the plaintiffs for making “overly broad” requests
by paring those requests back to the maximum level the court deems
permissible, and then finding that those “overly broad” requests now
weigh in favor of ordering the defendant to break the law.
In a dispute over the trademark used in hemp-related products, the
court noted that the “request for discovery goes beyond what is relevant,”
adding that the original requests sought “every email, Power Point
presentation, and other shred of paper regarding the development of both
the package [actually] used . . . as well as every package design that was
considered but not used. . .” 100 But the court simply pared back the
document requests and then found that this factor weighed in favor of
ordering the violation of French law. 101 By paring back the discovery
requests in these and other cases, courts have unwittingly encouraged
abusive discovery requests; they have also put a thumb on the scale in
favor of court-ordered law breaking. 102
96. Catalano v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 15-cv-4889 (KBF), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78901,
at *25 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016).
97. Ney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., No. 16-2408, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169371, at *15 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 6, 2016).
98. Id at *12.
99. Id. at *12-13.
100. Republic Techs. (Na), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, No. 16 C 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158986, at *14-15 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (internal quotations omitted).
101. Id.
102. See also Sant, supra note 1 at 202-203 (citing as examples Eikenberry v. Celsteel Ltd., No.
13 Civ. 4551(AT), 2013 WL 5308028, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2013); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC,
463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); Doster v. Schenk A.G., 141 F.R.D. 50, 53 (M.D.N.C.
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In sum, United States courts have overwhelmingly found that factor
two (“specificity”) weighs in favor of violating foreign laws. The fact that
courts have ruled by a ratio of fifteen-to-one that businesses must break
the law is strong evidence of pro-forum bias. Courts have frequently
misinterpreted the factor of specificity as asking whether document
requests are clearly written (instead of whether the requests are narrowly
tailored). Courts also regularly declare that extremely broad document
requests are “specific.” Most problematic of all, courts have encouraged
abusive litigation by paring back overly broad requests and then finding
that the requests now weigh in favor of breaking the laws of foreign
countries.
C.

Factor Three, “Origin of Information”

The third factor of the Aérospatiale test asks “whether the
information originated in the United States.” 103 While courts make
subjective judgments regarding each of the other four factors, this factor
asks an objective question. Thus, by comparing the results of the objective
factor to the four subjective factors, one can get a sense of the
pervasiveness of pro-forum bias.
Courts found that the objective factor (“origin of information”)
favored law breaking in only 11% of cases. By contrast, courts found each
of the four subjective factors to favor violating foreign law in at least 80%
of cases. Such an extreme difference in results indicates that courts may
be influenced by pro-forum bias in their treatment of the subjective
factors.
Moreover, courts show signs of pro-forum bias even when discussing
the objective factor (“origin of information”). Courts sometimes claim
that it is unclear whether the documents requested are located abroad,
even though there is no reason to believe they are located in the United
States. For example, one court declared that factor three (“origin of
information”) “also weighs in favor of production” based on this
extremely questionable logic: “To the extent [the defendant] sold its fibers
to companies in the United States to be incorporated into their asbestos
products, it is possible that documents regarding the sale of [the] fiber
could have originated in the United States.” 104 The court also cited the fact
that the Canadian defendant had already produced those documents that
1991).
103. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.28.
104. Ney v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., No. 16-2408, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 169371, at *13 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 6, 2016).
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were actually located in the United States as a reason for claiming that the
defendant’s remaining documents might also be located in the United
States. 105 None of this logic makes much sense. Selling products to
companies in the United States does not make the company’s internal
documents magically travel to the United States; moreover, the fact that
the company already produced those documents located in the United
States does not mean that the remaining documents are now somehow
located in the United States. Here, it seems, the court wanted to rule
against the defendant and was willing to do mental contortions to reach
the desired result.
Another court declared that “it is impossible to discern how much of
the information requested may have originated in the United States, since
no documents have been produced, identified, or described by the
defendant with any specificity.” 106 Here, the court blamed the defendant
for the failure to identify or describe the documents with any “specificity”,
although the burden of making clear document demands would seemingly
lie in the first instance with the requesting party. The court then speculated
that at least some of the documents may have originated in the United
States, concluding that “[t]his factor, therefore, is either neutral or weighs
slightly in favor of compelling disclosure.” 107 A number of other courts
have gone beyond speculation, simply asserting that information
originating outside the United States nevertheless somehow weighs in
favor of violating foreign law (or else that the factor is neutral). 108
To summarize, the Aérospatiale five-factor test’s sole objective
factor—the “origin of the information”—overwhelmingly weighs against
violating foreign law. The enormous divergence in results for the
objective factor and the four subjective factors strongly implies pro-forum
bias. Further evidence of pro-forum bias is the fact that courts have
frequently employed mental gymnastics in order to reach a preferred
result: that this factor is somehow either neutral or weighs in favor of
court-ordered law breaking despite the information’s origins abroad.

105. Id.
106. Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Heinkel AG & Co., 290 F. Supp. 3d 681, 690 (E.D. Mich.
2017).
107. Id.
108. See Sant, supra note 1 at 204-05 (discussing Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la Republica
de Chile v. Espirito Santo Bank, 09-20613-CIV, 2010 WL 2162868, at *5 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2010);
In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (D. Del. 2009); In re Air Crash at Taipei,
Taiwan on Oct. 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 378 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 2002)).
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Factor Four, “Alternative Means”

Factor four of the Aérospatiale test focuses upon “the availability of
alternative means of securing the information.” This, too, seems to be an
objective factor. Nations that are signatories to the Hague Convention or
to mutual legal assistance treaties have provided an “alternative means”
of obtaining the information, and therefore cases involving the laws of
these nations should always weigh in favor of respecting foreign law. In
reality, however, United States courts often convert factor four into a
subjective test by evaluating whether or not the court feels that the
“alternative means” is satisfactory to the court. 109 Needless to say, such
an attitude places the court in the inappropriate role of evaluating and
passing subjective judgment upon treaties between the United States and
foreign nations. Courts generally declare that factor four (“alternative
means”) favors violating foreign law despite such alternatives as the
Hague Convention, third-party subpoenas, mutual legal assistance
treaties, or commencing a legal action in the foreign nation. In total, 83%
of cases (57 out of 69) found that factor four (“alternative means”)
weighed in favor of court-ordered law breaking. As noted above, factor
four should have been treated as an objective factor. Considering that the
Hague Convention and other options are “alternative means” of obtaining
information, the problem is not that the results are lopsided but rather that
the lopsided results go in the wrong direction.
Courts regularly treat factor four (“alternative means”) as an
opportunity for the trial court to evaluate whether or not the trial court
itself feels that the international treaty is a sufficiently acceptable
alternative to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These trial courts then
reject international treaties as being insufficiently “similar” to the Federal
Rules in terms of speed, cost, and effectiveness. 110 These evaluations are
inappropriate as it is not the place of a trial court to measure whether a
given international treaty matches its own personal preferences.
Moreover, considering that a trial court can (under the Federal Rules)
simply order the production of documents, it is unclear what “alternative
means” would ever be deemed sufficiently similar to the Federal Rules to
meet these courts’ approval. And, as discussed above, this factor of the
Aérospatiale test only asks whether “alternative means” exist. There is no

109. See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Megan C. Chang & Terry E.
Chang, Brand Name Replicas and Bank Secrecy: Exploring Attitudes and Anxieties Towards Chinese
Banks in the Tiffany and Gucci Cases, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 425, 435 (2013) (noting
same problem).
110. See Sant, supra note 1 at 206-12.
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indication that these “alternative means” were to be evaluated and
dismissed if the court deems them to be, for example, overly “timeconsuming.”
Courts regularly reject out-of-hand “alternative means” of obtaining
information due to being insufficiently similar to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. One recent court declared, “Defendant does not proffer
any case law deeming the issuance of letters rogatory as substantially
equivalent to the Federal Rules,” adding that “case law universally
describe[s] this process as inefficient. . . .” 111 Another court declared that
“the Hague Convention likely is not an acceptable alternative to
proceeding under the FRCP.” 112 Courts rejecting such “alternative means”
as the Hague Convention and mutual legal assistance treaties often base
these decisions upon the purportedly slow speed of obtaining documents
through treaty procedures. 113 Yet these treaties are not actually slower
than United States litigation. By way of example, in Aérospatiale itself,
fifteen months passed just between the Eighth Circuit’s ruling and the
Supreme Court’s final decision on whether or not the plaintiffs needed to
proceed through the Hague Convention. 114 This Supreme Court decision,
in turn, came a full seven years after the filing of the underlying claim. 115
When United States courts can take seven years (in this admittedly
extreme case) to resolve the means by which evidence is gathered, it is
hard to give credence to complaints about the Hague Convention process
being too slow because it may “take upwards of six weeks to begin the
process.” 116
Moreover, it must be remembered that courts are demanding parties
violate foreign law on the justification that the Hague Convention may
take too many weeks. This reasoning displays a marked disrespect for the
law and for foreign sovereigns.
In one extreme example, a United States court’s rejection of the
Hague Convention process (as “time-consuming”) ended up forcing a
111. Burrow v. Forjas Tauras S.A., 16-21606-Civ-TORRES, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92959, at
*19 (S.D. Fla. June 16, 2017).
112. Connex R. R. LLC v. AXACorporate Sols. Assur., CV 16-02368-ODW (RAOx), 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215050, at *45 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017).
113. See, e.g., Gucci Am. v. Curveal Fashion, 09 Civ. 8458 (RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. March 8, 2010) (rejecting it as “time-consuming”); In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp. Inc.,
418 B.R. 833, 848 (D. Del. 2009) (rejecting the Convention because it can “take upwards of six weeks
to begin the process”).
114. The Eighth Circuit ruled on January 22, 1986. See In re Société Nationale Industrielle
Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986). The Supreme Court did not rule on this appeal until June
15, 1987, fifteen months later. See Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 522.
115. In re Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, at 122 (8th Cir. 1986).
116. In re Glob. Power Equip. Grp. Inc., 418 B.R. 833, 848 (D. Del. 2009).
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non-party bank to pay out a quarter of a million dollars in an unjustified
settlement. 117 The plaintiff demanded financial information from a bank
in Malaysia even though Malaysian law protected those bank records from
disclosure. The United States court rejected use of the Hague Convention
because “the procedures [of] the Hague Evidence Convention are much
more likely to be time-consuming. . .” 118 The bank (which was a nonparty to the underlying litigation) refused to violate Malaysian law,
explaining that the act of releasing private financial records is punishable
in Malaysia by a fine equal to about $900,000 USD and up to three years
in prison. 119 In response, the United States court sanctioned the bank
$10,000 per day. The non-party bank eventually settled with the plaintiff
for $250,000 USD, a settlement that did not provide the plaintiff with any
of the financial records at issue.120 The plaintiff law firm later released a
webcast trumpeting this “success.” 121
In a particularly striking analysis, one court blasted a defendant for
arguing that there was no need to violate foreign law because the desired
information was already available to the plaintiff (through corporate
witnesses who would testify in depositions and through documents
already produced). 122 The court declared: “The Court finds Defendant’s
argument sophistic. On one hand, Defendant contends the requested
information is protected by [Germany’s Federal Data Protection Act];
however, on the other hand, Defendant avers such information is available
via alternative means, i.e., past disclosures and their corporate
witnesses.” 123 The court’s reasoning places the defendant in a no-win
scenario: if the defendant is able to identify “alternative means” of
obtaining the information, then somehow this means that the foreign law
does not exist or can be ignored. But if the defendant cannot identify
“alternative means” of obtaining the information, then factor four must

117. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010).
118. Id.
119. Id. at *4, 6; see also Letter to Honorable Theodore H. Katz at 1, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal
Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 23).
120. Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 4-7, Gucci America, Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No.
09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (No. 32).
121. Gibson Dunn, Webcast: New Trends in Anti-Counterfeiting Litigation,
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/Webcast-NewTrendsinAntiCounterfeitingLitigation.aspx (last visited Mar. 10, 2015). The United Overseas Bank case is featured
in one of multiple slides entitled “Failing to Comply with Court’s Orders Can Result in Serious
Consequences for Third Parties. . .” (on file with author).
122. Zoch v. Daimler, No. 4:17-CV-578, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185343, at *15 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 8, 2017).
123. Id.
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weigh in favor of violating foreign law. Considering that factor four
(“alternative means”) specifically demands that the resisting party identify
other means of obtaining the desired information, the court should not use
defendant’s efforts to comply with this factor as a justification for
ordering the violation of foreign law. Nevertheless, other courts have
followed similar reasoning to declare that the availability of “alternative
means” of obtaining the information is itself a reason to doubt the
seriousness of the foreign laws at issue. 124
Courts have converted factor four (“alternative means”) from the
objective test it was intended to be into a subjective test. In particular,
many courts have taken it upon themselves to evaluate whether, in the
courts’ view, the international treaties are satisfactory to the court as an
alternative to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This is, of course, a
grossly inappropriate role for United States courts, which should not be
passing judgment upon the adequacy of United States treaties with foreign
nations. Courts have also concluded that treaties such as the Hague
Convention are unsatisfactory because they do not exactly mimic the
Federal Rules. Under such a standard, no “alternative means” can ever be
good enough (and if some “alternative means” perfectly duplicated the
Federal Rules, it would cease to be much of an alternative!). When
provided with alternative means of obtaining information, the courts
sometimes take the existence of “alternative means” of obtaining
information as proof that the foreign laws at issue are unworthy of respect.
Under this strange logic, the United States court proclaims that the ability
to obtain information without violating the law is a justification for
ordering a company to break the law. This logic eviscerates the
Aérospatiale test.
E.

Factor Five, “National Interests”

The fifth factor requires courts to weigh the interests of the United
States (in obtaining the information) against the foreign government’s
interest in its laws. United States courts overwhelmingly declare that the
United States’ interests are greater than the foreign state. Specifically,
courts found the United States’ interest to prevail in 81% of cases (52 out
of 64).

124. See, e.g., Skky, Inc. v. Thumbplay Ringtones, LLC, Nos. 13-2072 (PJS/JJG), 13-2083
(PJS/JJG), 13-2086 (PJS/JJG), 13-2087 (PJS/JJG), 13-2089 (PJS/JJG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
186391, at *18-19 (D. Minn. Apr. 3, 2014) (“Playboy and Manwin also claim some of the subject
documents are available through third parties located outside Québec, which raises questions as to
how Playboy and Manwin can claim those documents are shielded by the [Quebec law].”)
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United States courts have a cognitive bias when trying to weigh the
interests of the United States against foreign nations. This is because, first,
the courts are themselves part of the United States. Second, in most cases,
courts identify the primary interest of the United States in these disputes
as being the United States’ “vital” interest “in vindicating the rights of
American plaintiffs and in enforcing the judgments of its courts.” 125 In
other words, courts are weighing the value of their own work as courts. It
is questionable whether any court can objectively weigh the importance
or value of its own work in managing discovery against other nations’
interests. Courts also appear to be biased in favor of United States parties
simply due to the parties’ nationality. This is evident in the Ninth Circuit’s
language about “vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs,” 126 which
indicates that the nationality of the litigants may be influencing the courts’
rulings in favor of court-ordered law breaking. Many court decisions have
focused unseemly attention on the nationality of the parties in deciding
whether to order law breaking abroad. 127
For example, in one case, despite a letter from the French Ministry
of Justice urging that discovery be pursued through the Hague
Convention, the court concluded that “France’s interests, though strong,”
are outweighed by the United States “strong interest in vindicating the
rights of American plaintiffs.” 128 In another case, the court stated that the
United States’ interest in “vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs”
outweighed “the concerns of the German government with protecting its
citizens from unjustified compromises of their personal information.” 129

125. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992). Many
courts have repeated this language or reframed it as the “United States interest in fully and fairly
adjudicating the matters before its courts.” See, e.g., Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc..,
No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL 6330064, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2011) (quoting the language in
Richmark); In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on Oct. 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 379 (C.D. Cal. June
19, 2000) (partially quoting the language in Richmark).
126. Id. (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Trueposition Inc. v. LM Ericsson Tel. Co., No. 11-4574, 2012 WL 707012, at *5
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2012) (claiming that the United States’ interest in jurisdictional discovery “before
an American court” outweighed the foreign government’s interest); Consejo de Defensa del Estado
de la Republica de Chile v. Espirito Santo Bank, No. 09-20612-CIV, 2010 WL 2162868, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. May 26, 2010) (“this jurisdiction has an important interest in protecting its own nationals from
unfair disadvantage when they are being sued . . . .”); Reino de Espana v. Am. Bureau of Shipping,
No. 03 Civ. 3573 LTS/RLE, 2006 WL 2239641, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2006) (describing
“America’s interests in the fair adjudication of a billion dollar lawsuit brought against American
defendants in an American court.”).
128. Connex R. R. LLC v. AXACorporate Sols. Assur., No. CV 16-02368-ODW (RAOx), 2017
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 215050, at *47 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2017).
129. Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Heinkel AG & Co., No. 16-12022, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
196713, at *21 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2017).
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In another case, the court concluded that “Germany’s expressed interest
in protecting personal data through the [Federal Data Protection Act], its
constitution, its filing of an amicus brief . . ., and various other
expressions” was outweighed by the United States’ “substantial interest
in ‘vindicating the rights of American plaintiffs’ and ‘adjudicating matters
before its courts.’” 130 In each of these cases, the court focuses on the
nationality of the United States litigants and the supposed importance of
United States litigation, and the court concludes that these interests
outweigh such things as a foreign government’s constitution or a
statement of interest by its Ministry of Justice.
In one typical example, involving a trademark dispute with a
company located in France, a United States court declared that “the United
States also has its own sovereign interest in protecting its citizens.” 131 The
French defendant might well wonder based on this language whether the
court is acting as a neutral arbiter of legal disputes, or is instead acting to
“protect” the American litigants; the fact that this same court made this
statement while ordering the French company to violate French law is
certainly cause for concern.
There is another problem with courts declaring that their own work
in adjudicating disputes outweighs foreign countries’ interests in their
own laws. When the Supreme Court created the Aérospatiale balancing
test, it knew that this test would be applied in the context of United States
litigations. There is no other context in which the Aérospatiale test would
be applied. It thus seems unlikely that the Supreme Court actually
intended to weigh the United States’ interest in adjudication as part of the
test; rather, one would assume that the United States’ interest in
adjudicating disputes (to the extent this interest exists) is already baked
into the test. It would be strange indeed if courts conducting a balancing
test concluded that the test almost always weighed in favor of violating
foreign law because the issue came up as part of a litigation. How else
could the issue come before the court? And yet this is precisely the
reasoning applied by a large number of courts that have ordered the
violation of foreign laws.
In addition to overweighting the United States’ interest in
adjudicating litigations, United States courts have consistently struggled
to understand the foreign interests at stake. And yet, despite admittedly
not understanding these national interests, United States courts
130. Zoch v. Daimler, No. 4:17-CV-578, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185343, at *17-18 (E.D. Tex.
Nov. 8, 2017).
131. Republic Techs. (Na), LLC v. BBK Tobacco & Foods, No. 16 C 3401, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 158986, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2017) (internal citation omitted).
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consistently order these foreign laws to be broken. United States courts
routinely acknowledge they do not understand the foreign interests at
stake even as they conduct the Aérospatiale balancing test. 132 Even the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that it has “little competence in
determining precisely when foreign nations will be offended by particular
acts.” 133
The Aérospatiale test comes up most frequently in cases where
litigants demand from banks documents that are protected by the bank
secrecy and financial privacy laws of foreign countries. Nearly every
nation—including the United States—has financial privacy and bank
secrecy laws. 134 Nevertheless, United States courts routinely minimize
foreign nations’ objections to the extremely intrusive act of having private
financial records of individuals and companies sent abroad and reviewed
by foreign nationals. The American Bar Association has warned that
courts have focused too much upon “any applicable exceptions to the
foreign law and any ability of a banking customer to waive secrecy.” 135
132. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the “strength” of China’s interest in its state secrets is “unknown” despite China’s
government directly expressing concern about case); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
Nos. 3 Civ. 8845(TPG), 05 Civ. 2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ.
2690(TPG), 07 Civ. 6563(TPG), 08 Civ.2541(TPG), 08 Civ 3302(TPG), 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 09 Civ.
1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG), 2013 WL 491522, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (reasoning that
the interests of foreign nations in their privacy laws is “not clear” despite violators facing potential
prison sentences); AstraZeneca LP v. Breath Ltd., No. 08-1512 (RMB/AMD), 2011 WL 1421800, at
*15 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2011) (finding that Sweden’s interest is unclear); Devon Robotics v. DeViedma,
No. 09-cv-3552, 2010 WL 3985877, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 2010) (“unclear” whether Italian interests
would be impacted); British Int’l Ins. Co. Ltd. v. Seguros La Republica, S.A., No. 90 Civ.2370
(JFK)(FM), 2000 WL 713057, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2000) (Mexico’s interest in restricting access
to information about holding companies “difficult to gauge”); Doster v. Schenk, 141 F.R.D. 50, 54
(M.D.N.C. 1991) (stating that despite privacy rights being enshrined in Germany’s constitution, court
unsure as to whether Germany’s interest in privacy is “significant”).
133. Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983).
134. See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, Nos. 3 Civ. 8845(TPG), 05 Civ.
2434(TPG), 06 Civ. 6466(TPG), 07 Civ.1910(TPG), 07 Civ. 2690(TPG), 07 Civ. 6563(TPG), 08
Civ.2541(TPG), 08 Civ. 3302(TPG), 08 Civ. 6978(TPG), 09 Civ. 1707(TPG), 09 Civ. 1708(TPG),
2013 WL 491522 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2013) (identifying numerous nations with financial privacy laws);
Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same); Lakatos, supra note 56 at
45. Banks in the US “may have confidential supervisory information from their regulators—such as
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (‘OCC’), the Federal Reserve Board (‘FRB’), or Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘FDIC’)—that is subject to the bank examination privilege that only
the regulators may waive. Similarly, banks may have suspicious activity reports (‘SARs’) and related
documents that are subject to the SAR privilege that banks cannot waive, and indeed that banks are
criminally prohibited from disclosing. In some instances, international banks may have customer data
maintained in non-US jurisdictions, such as Switzerland or Hong Kong, that is subject to non-US
bank secrecy laws that afford the banks’ customers, not the banks, ownership of the privilege.”
135. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA, RESOLUTION 103, at 3 (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://perma.cc/UC9A-GQQ6.
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United States courts also often ignore the fact that banks are often
nonparties to these litigations. Frequently, the bank is not a defendant or
accused of wrongdoing, and yet a United States court is forcing the bank
to commit crimes in its home jurisdiction through producing protected
financial records.
Aérospatiale emphasized that substantive rules of law (such as bank
secrecy and financial privacy laws) are to receive greater deference than
generalized prohibitions against United States-style discovery 136 and that
courts should view “intrusive” discovery requests with great caution. 137
Yet even the Supreme Court’s example of “intrusive” discovery (a
production demand for “design specifications, line drawings, and
engineering plans. . .”) 138 pales in comparison to the intrusiveness of
forcing banks to hand over people’s private financial records. And yet,
despite the intrusiveness of demands for financial records and the
Supreme Court’s warning against intrusive discovery, courts have
generally not treated demands for bank records with any greater caution
when weighing court-ordered law breaking.
In an even more extreme and troubling development, some United
States courts have demanded that foreign governments punish companies
for obeying their orders. These United States courts demand that foreign
governments prove that they are serious about enforcing their law by
fining or jailing those who obey United States court orders demanding the
production of prohibited documents. It is hard to overstate the degree to
which such decisions undermine the rule of law by perversely demanding
both law breaking and the punishment of innocents forced into law
breaking. This goes beyond the already extreme situation discussed
throughout this article, in which parties and non-parties are ordered by
courts to violate foreign laws. The American Bar Association is among
those who have stated that court orders demanding the violation of foreign
laws “is inconsistent with promotion of rule of law, as it facilitates
violation of law, either abroad or here.” 139 But when courts go a step
further and demand that foreign governments punish those obeying
United States court orders to produce documents in violation of foreign
laws, this is troubling and outrageous. For example, in the recent case In
re Xarelto, the court declared:
136. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29 (quoting Restatement § 437, Reporter’s Note 5 at 4142).
137. Id. at 545.
138. Id.
139. HOUSE OF DELEGATES, ABA, RESOLUTION 103, at 3 (Feb. 6, 2012),
http://perma.cc/UC9A-GQQ6.
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Defendants carry the burden of providing evidence that Germany has
enforced the German Data Protection Act when German personal data
has been produced pursuant to a United States court order. Bayer failed
to meet this burden. When questioned at oral argument, counsel for
Bayer failed to cite any examples of a German entity being civilly or
criminally prosecuted for the production of personal data pursuant to a
United States discovery order. The Court finds this telling . . . . Thus,
the interests of Germany appear to be strong, but short of
overwhelming. 140

The court is effectively demanding that, if it wants its laws be taken
seriously by United States courts, Germany must imprison those who
obey United States court orders demanding information. In fact, it would
seem that the court expects that Germany should perhaps begin with
imprisoning the defendants (right after they produce the document
discovery in response to the United States court’s order). Here, the United
States court is truly Kafkaesque.
Nor is this the only decision to demand that foreign governments
prosecute and imprison people for obeying a United States court order. In
Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, for example, the court ordered the
production of documents in violation of the law in France, Jordan, and the
United Arab Emirates because the court was unaware of instances where
these nations had punished those obeying United States court orders. 141
Discussing the financial privacy laws of these nations, the judge asked:
“But is this [concern with financial privacy] for real? If a given country
truly values its national policy of, say, criminalizing compliance with a
U.S. court subpoena, it will prosecute its citizens for so complying.” 142
Perversely, the judge did not order violations of the law for those nations
that did have a track record of punishing compliance with United States
court orders. This dichotomy is problematic. First, these courts are
effectively rewarding those nations that are least respectful towards
United States court orders; the courts are effectively saying that the United
States will respect foreign laws so long as foreign governments do not
respect United States court orders. Second, (and the flipside of the above),
United States courts are effectively punishing those nations that are most
respectful towards United States court orders by declaring their laws
unworthy of respect. Third, United States courts are effectively
140. In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2592 SECTION L(EEF), 2016
LEXIS 95453, at *54-55 (E.D. La. July 20, 2016).
141. Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, No. 02-cv-666 (JSR), 2014 WL 7269724, at *4-5
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2014).
142. Id.
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demanding (or daring) foreign governments to severely punish those who
obey the United States court’s order. Fourth, it should be enough that at
least some foreign nations have prosecuted and punished those who have
complied with United States court-ordered law breaking. A United States
court should not demand proof from every single nation around the globe
that it has punished those obeying United States court orders before
recognizing that this is a real problem and that real human beings are being
jailed and harmed for no good reason. Think of it this way: should foreign
litigants require evidence that every single court in the United States has
punished those who disobey United States court orders in order to be
satisfied that United States courts take their orders seriously? What if a
nation—say, Poland—demanded examples of Polish businesses punished
by a United States court for failing to follow that court’s orders, and
concluded that if such examples could not be found, then United States
courts must not take their orders seriously? Or what if an example of a
Polish company punished in Texas for failing to follow a court order was
deemed insufficient because the current situation involved California?
The demand by United States courts that each nation provide multiple
examples of punishing compliance with United States court orders is
equally unreasonable.
One United States court brushed off the foreign nation’s financial
privacy laws, which punished violators with “one to five years
imprisonment,” by asserting that these laws “do not appear to be
enforced.” 143 Here, too, the court is effectively demanding that the foreign
government put someone in prison for up to a half-decade as punishment
for complying with the United States court’s own order. It is important to
remember that the court is demanding a half-decade in prison for real
people who are trying their best to follow the laws of both the United
States and their home jurisdiction. It is perverse that United States courts
demand to see otherwise innocent people imprisoned simply to prove that
the foreign government “cares” about its laws.
United States courts also frequently claim that the interests of the
foreign nation are different from what the foreign nation itself claims are
its interests. That is to say, the United States court will claim to know
better than the foreign government what that nation’s interests are. 144
143. In re Chevron Corp., No. 11-24599-CV, 2012 WL 3636925, at *13 (S.D. Fla. June 12,
2012).
144. See. e.g., Linde v. Arab Bank PLC, 706 F.3d 92, 111 (2d Cir. 2013); Linde v. Arab Bank,
PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 193 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 463 F. Supp. 2d 310, 315
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (each declaring that Jordan and Lebanon had different national interests than those
actually identified by Jordan and Lebanon as their national interests); see also Sant, supra note 1 at
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United States trial courts have proven themselves to be ill-suited for
the “delicate task” 145 of weighing the foreign interests of a foreign
government against the interests of the United States. Courts have
displayed pro-forum bias by claiming that the United States’ interest is to
“vindicate[e] the rights of American plaintiffs” in litigations.146 Courts are
generally unable to assess the foreign nations’ interests in their own laws,
and courts dramatically overvalue their own work of adjudication when it
comes to weighing the interests of competing governments. It is doubtful
that courts could ever objectively weigh the value of adjudication.
Moreover, it seems that the United States’ interest in adjudication is
already baked into the Aérospatiale test (because the Aérospatiale test can
only come up in the context of a litigation).
Worse, courts have sometimes demanded that foreign governments
fine and imprison those who would comply with United States courtordered law breaking. These courts have stated that they will not take
foreign laws seriously unless foreign nations punish those who obey
United States court orders. Needless to say, this logic is highly destructive
towards the rule of law, international comity, and foreign relations.
Almost as destructive is the assertion by some courts that they know better
than foreign governments the national interests of those governments.
V. NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF AÉROSPATIALE AND “PRO-FORUM BIAS”
Court-ordered law breaking in general, and the pro-forum bias of
United States courts applying the Aérospatiale test in particular, have set
in motion an avalanche of bad results. As discussed above, some courts
have undermined the rule of law and encouraged the punishment of
innocent people and businesses. 147
Courts have displayed a bias in favor of United States discovery and
against respecting foreign law. 148 The bias appears to be even stronger
against non-Western nations. 149 This disrespect for foreign nations’ laws
222-25.
145. Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
146. Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992);
Coloplast A/S v. Generic Med. Devices, Inc., No. C10-227BHS, 2011 WL 6330064, at *4 (W.D.
Wash. Dec. 19, 2011); In re Air Crash at Taipei, Taiwan on Oct. 31, 2000, 211 F.R.D. 374, 379 (C.D.
Cal. June 19, 2002).
147. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Sant, supra note 1.
149. Id. at 230-32. Although the evidence is suggestive, there are an insufficient number of cases
to determine whether or not the difference in results for Western nations and non-Western nations is
statistically significant. This is because “U.S. courts rarely find the Aérospatiale test’s subjective
factors to weigh in favor of respecting any foreign nation’s laws. But when they do, courts were much
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has apparently caused some foreign nations to issue orders demanding the
production and unsealing of confidential documents from the United
States. 150 For example, in 2015, a court in the United Kingdom ordered
the production of a document filed under seal by Judge Shea in the District
of Connecticut that is the “focus of an ongoing investigation” by the
Department of Justice. 151 Despite the Department of Justice’s appearance
in the United Kingdom case to assert the United States government’s
ongoing “interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the information,”
the United Kingdom court ordered the document to be revealed to the
opposing litigant. 152 Moreover, the United Kingdom court asserted that,
based on “the balance of factors,” it would “likely” release the sealed
document to the general public. 153 This same United Kingdom court stated
that its next step would be to consider possibly ordering production of
certain documents in violation of United States attorney-client
privilege. 154
Even worse, the willingness of United States courts to order law
breaking abroad has itself encouraged litigants to increasingly request that
courts order production of documents in violation of foreign laws. The
willingness of United States courts to issue these orders has encouraged
litigants to seek them as a way to pressure the foreign litigant into entering
into an unjustified settlement. By way of example, one court ordered a
non-party bank to produce documents in violation of the bank secrecy and
financial privacy laws of its home country. 155 When the bank could not
obtain the approval of its home regulator (and facing penalties of up to
three years in prison), 156 the bank refused to produce the documents. The
court then held the bank in contempt, imposing a $10,000 per day coercive
fine for noncompliance. One month later, the bank—a non-party not
accused of wrongdoing—settled with the plaintiff, paying $250,000

more likely to respect the laws of a Western nation than a non-Western nation.” Id. at 230.
150. See id. at 232-35.
151. Prop. Alliance Grp. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Scotland PLC [2015] EWHC (Ch) 321 [11]
(Eng.).
152. Id. at [25].
153. Id. at [40]. (“A year from now, when the case is approaching trial, . . . I regard it likely that
the balance of factors when considering whether a document like [this] should be referred to in open
court at trial is much more likely to come down in favour of publicity. . .”).
154. Id.
155. Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639, at
*4, 6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010); see also Letter to Honorable Theodore H. Katz at 8, Gucci Am., Inc.
v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09 Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (Docket
No. 23).
156. Id. at 1.
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USD. 157 The settlement did not provide the plaintiff with any financial
records about the actual defendants. 158
Over the past decade, the number of requests for United States courts
to order law breaking abroad has grown at an exponential rate. In the first
ten years after Aérospatiale, only two cases applied the five-factor
Aérospatiale test to decide whether or not to order foreign lawbreaking. 159 By contrast, there were fourteen cases in just the last three
years. The rate at which litigants are requesting courts order the violation
of foreign laws has increased more than twentyfold since the first decade
after Aérospatiale.
This rapid increase in requests for court-ordered law breaking is
presented in chart form below. As can be seen, there were virtually no
requests for court-ordered law breaking during the first decade after
Aérospatiale. A few years later, however, the number of requests
exploded, and there appears to be no end in sight.
80
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157. Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 4-7, Gucci Am., Inc. v. Curveal Fashion, No. 09
Civ. 8458(RJS)(THK), 2010 WL 808639 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2010) (Docket No. 32).
158. Id. at 4-5.
159. The numbers discussed here do not include cases that applied the three-factor or four-factor
Aérospatiale tests. See, e.g., First Am. Corp. v. Price Waterhouse LLP, 154 F.3d 16 (2d. Cir. 1998)
(applying the four-factor test). The focus here is the rapid growth of these cases in a short amount of
time.
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This exponential rate of growth in court-ordered law breaking is not
explainable as a steady growth in international litigation over time.
Rather, litigants appear to have made a calculated change in litigation
strategy in response to the realization that courts overwhelmingly approve
requests to order the violation of foreign laws. By seeking documents that
cannot be produced, litigants force the opposing party to either break the
law in its home country or violate a United States court order—or agree
to an unjustified settlement. 160
The willingness of courts to order law breaking abroad has damaged
the rule of law, harmed international relations, encouraged foreign
governments to reveal documents sealed by a United States court,
stimulated abusive discovery, and has encouraged unwarranted
settlements. Worst of all, court-ordered law breaking has itself
encouraged litigants to request that courts issue more of these orders.
Courts are themselves responsible for the strange phenomenon of courtordered law breaking.
VI. CONCLUSION
Courts applying the Aérospatiale test to determine whether or not to
order law breaking abroad have overwhelmingly declared that each of the
subjective factors weighs in favor of violating the law. The lopsided ratios
by which courts have reached these results (as high as fifteen-to-one)
strongly indicate that United States courts are influenced by pro-forum
bias.
Courts frequently convert factor one (“importance”) into a test of
mere “relevance”. Even courts that do not make this mistake frequently
create a very low standard for “importance”, finding “importance”
satisfied even when the underlying litigation is clearly without merit.
Likewise, courts frequently convert the second factor (“specificity”)
into a test of whether the production requests are clear as opposed to
whether or not the requests are narrowly tailored. Worse, instead of
simply rejecting overly broad requests, many courts will pare the requests
back to the broadest level the court finds acceptable. This encourages
litigants to make overly broad requests, and also puts the thumb on the
scale in favor of ordering law breaking abroad.
Factor three (“origin of information”) is the only objective factor.

160.
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The extreme difference in results between this objective factor and the
four subjective factors further indicates that courts may be influenced by
pro-forum bias.
Factor four (“alternative means”) should be an objective factor, but
has been converted by trial courts into a subjective test of whether or not
the Hague Convention or other treaties (or other means of obtaining
information) meet with the court’s subjective approval. This puts the court
in the unseemly position of passing subjective judgment upon whether
multilateral treaties entered into by the United States deserve respect.
Factor five (weighing U.S. and foreign interests) has devolved into a
comparison of the respective importance of foreign laws and the United
States’ interests in managing litigation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, courts—
the very entity that manages United States litigations—find that the
United States’ interest in litigation is of supreme importance and that it
consistently outweighs all possible interests of foreign sovereigns. One
indication of pro-forum bias is the unseemly focus by courts upon the
nationality of the litigants and the professed desire to “vindicate[e] the
rights of American plaintiffs” in litigations.161 Courts also prove
themselves unable to effectively assess foreign nations’ interests, and in
some cases, lower courts even insist that they know better than the foreign
nation what its own interests are. Even more offensive is the demand by
some courts that foreign governments imprison and fine those who would
obey United States court orders.
With courts overwhelmingly biased in favor of ordering companies
to break the law overseas, litigants have increasingly requested courtordered law breaking. This abusive discovery tactic seeks to trap the
opposing party between a United States court order and foreign law.
Requests for court-ordered law breaking have exploded in number.
The willingness of United States courts to order foreign law breaking
has damaged international comity, infuriated foreign sovereigns, and led
to retaliatory actions, such as the recent order by a United Kingdom court
forcing production of a document filed under seal by a United States court.
The Supreme Court should step in to resolve circuit splits regarding
the proper way to handle requests for information that would violate the
law. There is likewise a circuit split regarding the degree to which banks
are obligated to produce documents protected by bank secrecy and
financial privacy laws. The Supreme Court should declare that litigants
seeking protected documents from abroad must first resort to the Hague
Convention or to mutual legal assistance treaties, and only seek court161.

Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992).
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ordered law breaking if those efforts fail.
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